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DEATH AND INJURY IN INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT
PETER MARTIN*
J AM greatly honoured by your invitation to come here to Dallas
to address you. But you must not think that my views are those
of anyone but myself. Thus, they are not necessarily those of
operators, manufacturers, insurers or even my partners. They are
mine and I take full responsibility for them while recognizing my
debt to all those who have enabled me to discover what the prob-
lems are and to guess at how they might be solved.
It is a commonplace that outside the United States there has
been remarkably little litigation arising out of death and injury
suffered by passengers in the course of international air transport.
I believe the reasons for this are:
1. The effectiveness of the reversed burden of proof system of
the Warsaw Convention, the Warsaw Convention as amended at
the Hague and the Montreal Agreement, (coupled with the exist-
ence of certain special contracts relating to compensation such as
that introduced by British European Airways and now adopted by
British Airways and others) in bringing about reasonable settle-
ments without the need for liability trials.
2. The fact, as I believe it to be, that outside the United States
injured passengers and families of passengers killed in aircraft acci-
dents are-or were in the past at least-less litigious and more
inclined to settle for modest, fixed-limit-damages in accordance
with national law methods of assessment rather than engage in the
expense and uncertainty of litigation for the purpose of breaking
the Convention limit or proving the liability or negligence of manu-
facturers and others. Certainty of some compensation was traded
off against the uncertainty of full compensation of negligence of
manufacturer and others.
* LLB, MRAe S, a Solicitor of the Supreme Court, London, England.
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3. The fact that previously, when accidents were smaller, there
was much less publicity for them than there is now. The world-wide
circulation of information results, of course, in far greater world-
wide interest in these bigger accidents of today, and this is coupled
with contact between the families of victims on an international
scale. The best example of the results of this trend is the newly
found Japanese taste for litigation-unheard of 10 years ago.
4. Leaving aside the political problems, the well known difficul-
ties of discovering facts relating to aircraft accidents, particularly
in countries where discovery of facts in litigation cannot be con-
ducted by the same sort of processes as the deposition taking pro-
cess in the United States, coupled with the less adventurous spirit
of lawyers faced with strictly applied rules of evidence and an
apparently unchallengeable system of law.
5. Respect by the judiciary for the Convention system in most
countries outside (and even most States within) the United States.
Although the intention of the Warsaw Convention/Hague Proto-
col system was to create a system of compensation for death or in-
jury arising out of international air transport which would have the
result of providing quick settlements without litigation because of
the reversal of the burden of proof and the availability of what
were originally regarded as adequate damages, we all know now
that time had eroded the effectiveness of the system. The damages
available under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, the
Warsaw Convention as amended at the Hague and even the Mon-
treal Agreement, are generally regarded as insufficient to meet the
damages suffered by a large variety of passengers and their de-
pendents in cases of injury or death. We seem little nearer the uni-
versal implementation of the Guatemala Protocol principally be-
cause of questions relating to the method of valuing "Convention"
gold francs and these will not now be answered quickly. Although
a few carriers have adopted special contracts on the lines of the
British Airways model, this is by no means a lead likely to be fol-
lowed universally. By 1st April 1975 British Airways and many
other European and non European carriers will have adopted this
approach. The delay in the ratification and implementation of the
Guatemala Protocol, now four years old, is a particularly poor
example of the way the United States sometimes leads the world
from the rear in marking time when the rest of the world could be
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benefited from its lead even if the lead did not wholly satisfy the
United States. The rest of the world is disbenefited by the United
States' attitude.
Accordingly, given the law as it stands at present, there is now
much more than previously a real anxiety on the part of passengers,
their relatives and their advisers on the one hand, and carriers,
manufacturers and their insurers on the other to have information
about an accident at an early stage which will enable rational and
well informed negotiating positions to be adopted on each side,
bearing in mind that the carriers' usual offer of convention damages
without reliance on its possible defense may not be sufficient to
settle the whole claim in present times. Leaving aside the obvious
need for information for safety reasons, other needs manifest them-
selves very quickly. The carrier wishes to know if it can use the
defense of unavoidable accident for the purposes of negotiation
and whether it is at risk in terms of a possible action based upon
its perhaps having caused the accident by wilful or reckless mis-
conduct. The manufacturer wishes to know if it has been negligent
or whether strict liability rules will or may apply to his part, if any,
in the accident.
Passengers and their advisers wish to know the strength or weak-
ness of their position generally. Thus you have, taking these re-
quirements for information as a whole, a real need for early but
precise information readily available to all concerned. Bearing in
mind the differences of the law of evidence of most countries, bear-
ing in mind how frequently it is the case (rather than the reverse)
that no accident report is published or that it is inadequate when
published for the purpose of providing evidence in an action on
liability there is now a great and growing pressure to permit access
by passengers and those representing them or their estates and de-
pendents to the investigation on an official basis. I cannot support
this pressure because I believe the results would be inimical to the
fundamental purpose of accident investigation without producing
a valuable improvement. Every care must be taken to avoid the
pursuit of sectional interests in accident investigation and I just
do not believe that those representing passengers could resist this
temptation. But I can see why the argument is advanced and, cer-
tainly, something will have to be done to meet it. Leaving aside all
other issues, I regard it as outrageous in human terms that the
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relatives of passengers killed in aircraft accidents often have to
wait years to discover in what circumstances the passenger died and
sometimes do not discover this at all. In human terms, the inade-
quacy of performance of many aircraft accident investigation au-
thorities is inexcusable. I can give many, many examples of cases
where no accident report has been published at all or where it has
taken one, two or three years for it to be published and then, fre-
quently, in terms so imprecise, inadequate or politically biased as
to be almost meaningless for any legal, human or safety purpose.
The only proper approach to aircraft accident investigations is
that it must establish the facts and that there should be sufficient
and speedy publication of the results of the investigation to enable
all concerned to learn from it for the sake of the travelling public
as a whole. Everything done in such an investigation must be for
the purpose of determining accurately all the circumstances and
causes of an accident with a view to avoiding repetitions. An ancil-
lary consideration which must now be borne in mind is that the
results may be and indeed should be useful for other purposes.
Given the immense complexity and expense of settling the legal
consequences of an international aircraft accident (or indeed any
aircraft accident) these days, all engaged in these matters should
have in their hands as quickly as possible after an accident a report
of the investigation which is sufficiently comprehensive and objec-
tive to enable both the representatives of passengers and the repre-
sentatives of all potentially liable parties and their insurers to use
it as a reliable and complete basis for settling the consequential
claims for compensation so as to avoid, if possible, the necessity
for long and expensive proceedings in different countries. Admissi-
bility in evidence, whether subject to challenge or not, is a matter
which requires careful consideration. More frequently than not,
however, there is either no report or a report so inadequate and
delayed that litigation becomes inevitable if injustice and hard-
ship are to be avoided. Believing as I do that much unnecessary
litigation and consequent unhappiness would be avoided by the
early publication of complete reports of thorough investigations,
what is really wrong with the present system of investigation of
international aircraft accidents under Annex 13 of the Chicago
Convention and ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation
I Doc. 6920-AN /855/4.
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is the subject of this paper. Bearing in mind that it is possible only
to generalize in a short paper of this kind, I have the following
points to make about the system:
1. There is the fact that many countries simply do not apply
Annex 13 and the procedures set out in the Manual although they
are parties to the Chicago Convention. I must add here that I refer
in this paper to Annex 13 because I have in mind accidents which
are international in character, that is, accidents (occurring in one
state) to aircraft registered in another state. In many domestic
accident cases no attempt is made to apply even these minimum
standards.
2. Much more important in practice, there are many countries
in which Annex 13 and the ICAO Manual are applied in such a
way as to render the investigation valueless. This is due to a num-
ber of causes. Often the requirements of the local law and of local
procedures are applied in a way which produces a sterile interpreta-
tion. Sometimes this results from a distrust of the motives of per-
sons and bodies wishing to participate. It also results from conflict-
ing interests between these persons and bodies and the investigating
authority. Often there are also jealousies between accident investi-
gation authorities and judicial authorities charged with criminal in-
vestigation. There are also political questions. In many cases, diffi-
culties arise due to the inadequacy of local resources and the high
costs of mounting a comprehensive accident investigation coupled
with a nationalistic refusal or reluctance by the state concerned to
admit its shortcomings in this area.
3. There is a conscious or unconscious desire to conduct and
conclude investigation in such a manner as to absolve from any
possibility of blame the authorities or nationals of the country in
which the inquiry is held, particularly if there is adverse publicity
of a national agency such as air traffic control or an aerodrome
authority during the period immediately after an accident.
4. In the context of tort liability and also the organizational
arrangements which are necessary to ensure that evidence is avail-
able and can be fully considered by experts, it is plain that there
is often ignorance on the part of accident investigators, or so called
accident investigators, of the detailed matters of evidence which
may be crucial to the determination of the causes of an accident
generally. We must not expect accident investigators to be lawyers
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or even to have an eye always on the courts, but there is room for
some greater degree of understanding of the legal problems lawyers
have to face; in some countries, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, the understanding is very considerable but in
others it is wholly non-existent.
I should add here that legal ideas may no longer be in step with
recent technological advances when it comes to the determination
of responsibility. I also believe that accident investigators in some
countries are occasionally hoodwinked by interested parties who
have much to lose from making available, let alone publishing the
facts, and in this context it must be remembered that Annex 13
has no teeth to show, let alone bite with, when it comes to the
production of information.
5. Delay places all parties into false negotiating positions on lia-
bility, is inimical to the fundamental purpose of accident investiga-
tion and is disgraceful in terms of its effect on people as human
beings with feelings. Two years for the production of an accident
report by the French, for example, is just about the average and
this sort of delay is, in my view, wholly unforgiveable, particularly
when the report itself shows clear signs of political yard arm clear-
ing. When any one or more of the features I have mentioned is
present, the result is that these features tend to reduce or even to
extinguish altogether the value of the investigation generally and
particularly in the context of liability. In particular, these features
are likely to result in the non-availability and sometimes in the
total suppression of vital evidence.
A frequent result of some of the features is the exclusion from
the investigation process of persons, such as the expert representa-
tives of interested parties of integrity, who might greatly contribute
to the usefulness of the inquiry; but who is to know who has in-
tegrity and who does not? That is the core of this particular
problem.
What are the practical results of these inadequacies in the pres-
ent system of international aircraft accident inquiry as applied in
many countries in the context of liability? In the past, as I have
seen it, there can be little doubt that the inadequate performance
of certain national aircraft accident inquiry authorities has made
it easier rather than more difficult for claims to be settled upon the
basis of the system of limited compensation created by the Warsaw
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Convention as amended at the Hague by the Hague Protocol and
refined by the Montreal Agreement and the British Airways type
special contract. Where it was plain to both sides, as it so frequently
was, that no facts were likely to be available in the short term
upon which an action to "break" the Convention system might be
mounted, there was undoubtedly pressure to settle claims against
the carrier within the two year period. Actions against manufac-
turers were so rare as to be almost non-existent. Right or wrong,
this is the way it was, and it is remarkable how little pressure for
change there has been from the public. But in the last few years,
as I have said when I began, things have changed and they have
changed for two main reasons.
The first reason for change, as I suggested at the outset, is be-
cause the Warsaw/Hague/Montreal special contract damages have
become inadequate to meet general standards of damage awards
in many jurisdictions. I will not enter here into the gold clause
argument because it is not really relevant to what I want to say
here. I set out below a table which I have had prepared to show
what capital sums are now required in England to produce certain
annual incomes, using as a method of calculation the system laid
down by the House of Lords in the important case of Taylor v.
O'Connor.!
STATEMENT OF CAPITAL SUMS REQUIRED
in the U.K.
TO PRODUCE ANNUAL AMOUNTS
(OF CAPITAL AND INCOME) FOR 44 YEARS
FOR A WIDOW AGED 35 YEARS
ANNUAL AMOUNT CAPITAL SUMS REQUIRED
Interest Interest Interest
at 3% p.a. at 4% p.a. at 5% p.a.
1,000 24,254 20,549 17,663
2,000 48,509 41,098 35,326
3,000 72,763 61,646 52,988
4,000 97,017 82,195 70,651
5,000 121,272 102,744 88,314
6,000 145,526 123,293 105,977
NOTES:
1. The 'Annual Amount' shown above has been calculated on
the basis described by Lord Pearson in the House of Lords
2 (1971) AC 115.
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case of Taylor v. O'Connor;' that is to say it is made up
partly of income and partly of capital.
2. It is assumed that the capital fund would be invested pri-
vately and not utilized in the purchase of an annuity. This
would give greater flexibility and allow periodical changes in
investments to provide the required income and endeavour
to keep pace with inflation and other economic or taxation
considerations.
3. The income element of the annual sum will be subject to tax.
The rates of 3%, 4% and 5% used in the example indicate
the required net rates of interest, after deduction of tax from
higher gross amounts.
4. It does not seem practical to make specific provision for
taxation in the present figures but the effect must be con-
sidered. In the early years the income proportion of the an-
nual amount will be relatively high and thus liable to the
higher rates of tax whereas in later years the amounts will
comprise mainly capital and the income may fall below the
tax exemption limits.
5. It has been assumed that the annual sum will be payable for
the full period of expectation of life of the beneficiary con-
cerned, namely 44 years in the present examples.
Although methods of calculation differ, these figures are typical
of many countries outside the United States. It can be seen at once
that U.S. $10,000, U.S. $20,000 and even U.S. $75,000 or even the
Guatemale Protocol U.S. $120,000 will not provide the sort of
damages which in many typical dependancy cases are needed to
compensate for death of a breadwinner. What is the result? The
result is that from the very outset after an accident, injured pas-
sengers and the families of passengers killed in an accident begin
now to look for ways in which they can obtain damages in excess
of limited compensation amounts either by means of actions under
Article 25 of the Convention against the carrier or against the
manufacturer of the aircraft, air traffic control or some other third
party agency. These steps are not taken because of the need for
money only. Grief, rage, fear, and a desire to be revenged on "big
business," also play a strong, if often wholly irrational, part in
much of the new litigation. These personal attitudes are fed by
slanted publicity and, in my view, the irresponsible activities of
the so-called "plaintiffs' bar." This brings me to my next point.
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Although it is perhaps remarkable that there have been so very few
actions world wide arising out of death and injury in international
air transport during the last few years and outside the United States,
I ask you to look at a table prepared to show jet total losses during
the ten year period from 1965 to 1974 which I set out below.
1965-74 JET TOTAL LOSSES
(Scheduled & Non-Scheduled)
(Western world aircraft & operators)
Non-US
Total Passenger US Built Built US Non-US
Losses Fatalities Jets Jets Operators Operators
1965 9 249 9 0 7 2
1966 15' 452 10 51 3 121
1967 12 355 8 6 6 6
1968 282 344 20' 8 7 214
1969 17 529 12 5 4 13
1970 261 548 18 86 117 17'
1971 10 348 7 3 4 6
1972 25' 1028 17 89 6 199
1973 32"0 923 2410 8 910 2310
1974 2111 1228 1512 613 912 1213
1 Inc. Trident lost on flight trials.
I Inc. 9 Beirut losses and 3 ground losses.
3 Inc. 9 Beirut losses and 2 ground losses.
"Inc. 9 Beirut losses and 3 ground losses.
'Inc. 4 A/C destroyed on ground by Palestinian terrorists.
'Inc. 3 A/C destroyed on ground by Palestinian terrorists.
7Inc. 2 A/C destroyed on ground by Palestinian terrorists.
'Inc. 2 A/C destroyed on ground by Palestinian terrorists.
'Inc. VFW-614 lost on flight trials.
10 Inc. JAL 747 destroyed by Palestinian terrorists. Also Pan Am 707 at Rome
and I ground loss.
"Inc. 4 ground losses (inc. 1 in Cyprus).
12 Inc. 2 ground losses.
13 Inc. 2 ground losses (inc. 1 in Cyprus).
Source: Airclams Limited, London.
It is immediately obvious from a study of this table that the
number of aircraft built in the United States and totally lost each
year far exceeds the number of those built outside the United
States totally lost, while at the same time the number of non-
United States operators of these same aircraft involved in accidents
far exceeds the number of United States operators. What con-
clusion, however crude, may be drawn from these statistics? My
conclusion must be, and we are now beginning to have to face
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the facts, that there may in the future be more and more actions
(in the United States and elsewhere) against the manufacturers of
aircraft and their ancillary equipment and engines by passengers
injured in accidents or the families of passengers killed in accidents
involving non-U.S. carriers whether such actions against the manu-
facturers are justified on facts and whether the litigants are United
States citizens. Actions against air traffic control or airport au-
thorities will, in my view, be fewer as government agencies are
notoriously hard to sue in almost all countries.
Bearing in mind the activities of what must now be described,
I suppose, as the "international plaintiffs' bar" in the United States,
it can be seen at once that it is a matter of the utmost simplicity for
an action, whether ill founded or well founded, to be brought
against the manufacturer in the United States and for discovery
procedures to be begun for the purpose of trying to force the de-
fendant or defendants into an early settlement position so that
damages may be recovered in addition to those which may be
recoverable, whether in the United States or elsewhere, from the
carrier under the limited compensation provision. Often, such litiga-
tion is begun before there have been any negotiations of any kind-
often to the distress of the plaintiff parties who find the delays hard
to understand-let alone bear! They often just do not know what
the issues are and are not advised either of the issues or kept in-
formed of the progress of the litigation by those representing them.
They are, I assume, sustained by promises, life insurance and social
security! It is inevitable that heavy litigation must result because
neither the manufacturers nor even the carriers can allow the risk
of jury awards of damages in some United States jurisdictions to
go unchallenged, particularly when the accident victims are domi-
ciled in jurisdictions where damage awards on the scale usual in
the jurisdiction of their domicile are far smaller than jury awards
in the United States for persons in similar circumstances. The
classic case is the non-dependency death case where serious philo-
sophical differences in the theory of damages occur from country
to country. In other words, it is inevitable that carriers and manu-
facturers can and must fight to prevent what they see as unjust
enrichment as contrasted with fair compensation. That is the pat-
tern of the future-unless the basic rules of the game are quickly
changed. But this is a whole subject in itself which merits long
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and careful debate for which, sadly, we have no time here. I must
add that I believe that those of us who work on the defense side
are acutely aware of the injustice of the limited compensation sys-
tem as it is at present, we regret the slowness of international
negotiation on Guatemala, and we view with concern the possi-
bility of more and more litigation against manufacturers and others
(and between carriers and manufacturers) which must result from
the lack of uniformity in approach to liability questions and to
damage awards in different countries.
I am not one who believes that litigation purges defendants of
wickedness and that a jury trial purifies the soul. I do believe that
litigation in personal injury or death cases should be unnecessary.
I believe that much of the aviation litigation that is now becoming
so commonplace even outside the United States need not take place
if, but only if, the process of fact finding could be speeded up to
enable all the parties concerned to be given some rational basis for
negotiations at the earliest possible moment. This must be coupled,
however, with an abandonment or radical revision of the limited
compensation system although I hope that such abandonment or
revision could be still combined with a continuation of the reversal
of the burden of proof. I doubt whether even the Guatemala Proto-
col or the European special contract experiment will avoid the need
for very radical change in the existing system soon. I believe that it
is as a result, very largely but not entirely, of the inadequate im-
plementation of ICAO standards coupled with the inadequacies of
the Warsaw/Hague/Montreal system and the activities of the plain-
tiff's bar that heavy litigation has become so much a commonplace
now, whereas in the past the reverse was true.
If the facts are known, then the parties negotiate; if they are
not, they do not. However I am bound in honesty to add that dis-
covery procedures (and in particular depositions) do have a marked
effect on the attitude of parties to negotiate, but it is a costly feature
of the United States litigation scene which I should prefer not to
spread! There are undoubtedly conflicts in procedure that arise
when investigations are carried on for pure accident protection
purposes and when investigations are carried on for the purpose of
enabling fault to be proved as part of an enforcement or litigation
process. There is the well known conflict between frank disclosure
of accident/incident information on the one hand and the risk of
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prosecution or litigation on the other. There is also the question of
the role of the aircraft accident investigator in legal proceedings.
These conflicts are not surprising since there are many areas where
accident prevention of legal process touch particularly in the search
for facts. Indeed, a paradox occurs assuming you accept the pre-
mise that tort and criminal law systems serve as a deterrent to
unsafe behaviour yet have a negative influence on the open ex-
change of safety information. What is required to put this problem
right is some modification of Annex 13 and the Warsaw/Hague
system after an international conference on the subject by giving
the accident investigators sharper teeth and modernizing the con-
vention system in order to make the compensation of victims of
international aircraft accidents more a matter of certainty and less
of a lottery than it is now becoming. I am sure, however, that
limited compensation systems themselves will have to disappear
altogether if any measure of accord is to be reached with the United
States and if such accord is to include potential tort feasors other
than carriers. It is something which all of us concerned with this
topic should want to achieve but it will not be easy. Just for once,
could not the divided parts of our profession combine to produce
a major change in the law instead of feeding on the inadequacy of
the existing system?
A sub-topic I want to discuss in this paper is the question of
what I describe as "immediate post accident actions." Under this
heading I list all those matters of human relations which are dealt
with in the emergency accident procedures of reputable carriers.
Sadly, I have discovered that few of those carriers with whom I
have been concerned have any idea of what should be done in the
matter of human relations after an accident and this is particularly
true if an accident occurs to an aircraft outside the country of its
home base and in a country where there are ethnic, religious and
language differences. It has surprised me, year after year, that
where an accident occurs in these circumstances, neither IATA
nor ICAO nor any one else besides the airline itself, its insurers
and the hard-pressed local authorities are able or willing to give
any help in dealing with these complex matters of notification of
families, identification and disposal of human remains and many
other problems of a related nature. Accidents are about death
and destruction-not litigation-and should be looked at in this
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way by those with power to influence change for the better. I be-
lieve the industry could and should foster a study of this problem
and that this should be done quickly before we have another major
disaster involving 350 deaths or more. Should we not be thinking
of some centralized system of help to be given to carriers in these
circumstances? You have only to consider the problems faced by
airlines whose aircraft has an accident involving serious personal
injury or loss of life in a country outside the country of its home
base where it may have only a small staff separated from that base
by 8, 10 or 12 hours flying time and the barriers of race and re-
ligion to realize just how serious the immediate problems can be
particularly if the local search, rescue and hospitalization facilities
are not of the highest standard.
My second point concerns the activities of the "international
plaintiffs' bar" to which I referred earlier. The fact is that in the
last few years the "international plaintiffs' bar" has, in aviation
matters at least, emerged from the relative seclusion of the United
States to become a major trading force outside the United States.
I am reminded by their activities of the immigrant runners of the
mid-19th century who profited from the ignorance, poverty and
misfortune of those from England and Ireland who chose the
United States as a home and who journeyed to and arrived there
penniless to seek their fortune. In the past few years, I have seen
evidence of abuses of the theoretically respectable system of the con-
tingent fee which should, in my personal view, be the subject of
the closest investigations by the judicial authorities and the respon-
sible bar associations of the United States. I fail to see why the con-
tingent fee system and all that goes with it should be necessary in
the context of aviation accident litigation if we can produce at
least some of the reforms I have outlined above, but I well recog-
nize all the arguments for its existence and continuation. Given
the abolition of jury trial, which in my view is quite unsuitable for
the complex task of assessing facts and damages in modem times,
given fixed costs for legal work and the system of payment into
court such as exists under the English Rules of the Supreme Court,
coupled with an actuarial system of assessment of damages, which
takes account of inflation and taxes, I am sure that quicker, cheap-
er and more adequate compensation could be obtained for victims
of aircraft accidents. More for the victims and less for the lawyers
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must be the right approach. I know that I am asking a lot since the
contingent fee system and a jury trial are as American as apple
pie. To the outsider, however, much of the system is depressing-
particularly the lack of serious settlement negotiations for the bene-
fit of clients which have so characterized much recent litigation.
Years pass and we are not even told what the claims are worth
while the litigation is kept running to justify the contingent fee.
Clearly, we should all take active steps to bring about reforms for
a very important reason.
Quite apart from my personal feelings for or against jury trials,
contingent fees and all the rest, I believe that aviation litigation,
such as we are experiencing in the United States, seriously dam-
ages public confidence in the relative safety of airline operations
and the relative airworthiness of aircraft products. It also gives rise
to nightmare anxieties about the wickedness of big business and the
inefficiency of governments. We all know that there is some prob-
ability, capable of mathematical calculation by reference to sta-
tistics, of accidents to aircrafts either as a result of operational in-
adequacies or manufacturing defects. Everyone knows this. But
the effect of the litigation is, in my view, not so much to bring
about improvement, although it certainly should do so, but rather
to create what is often a wholly unjustified suspicion that all oper-
ations and all aircraft products are inadequate or unsafe with the
result that litigation breeds further litigation and greater uncertain-
ty. I must add that litigation may have, and I believe does have, a
counterproductive effect on air safety. The manufacturers who be-
come aware of a weakness in their products do go to great lengths
to conceal that weakness by avoiding publication of information
about it because they know that the moment an accident occurs in
which this weakness may be a feature the very publication of the
information giving a warning may be regarded as admission of cul-
pability by the manufacturer. In this context, it is worth noting
that the confidential exchange of safety information within the
IATA Accident and Incident Exchange Group has been sterilized
between United States carriers because of the fear that the defect
report may lead to the exposure of a carrier or carriers to damage
claims.
In summary, I am concerned with the present inadequacies of
many operators in the context of immediate post accident pro-
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cedures. I am concerned with the inadequacies of many national
aircraft accident investigation authorities in the context of Annex
13 and the ICAO Manual. I am concerned about the slowness of
compensation in cases involving a multiplicity of potential de-
fendants because they have no basis for negotiations. I am con-
cerned about unnecessary litigation and the activities of those to
whom litigation has become an industry itself in which the profit
motive outweighs the interests of the consumer of their product.
I am concerned about the inadequate policing, not just of airlines,
manufacturers and others engaged in aviation, but also of the legal
profession itself. I know that the human condition is imperfect and
unhappy and I know that bringing about change in the conduct
of human affairs is slow, but I am not beyond hoping that, slowly
but surely, men of goodwill concerned with a truly international
and human problem may bring about improvement. This must
result in speedy, just compensation based upon knowledge of the
facts and the assessment of damages by an established and accep-
table method of calculation which will avoid the slow moving
wheel of fortune that litigation really is. It must at the same time
advance the cause of air safety.
We must make our government change the system, not try to
change it through the courts slowly and at vast expense in time,
human feelings and money.
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